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A Bigger Splash to the Narrative1 
Vinicius Oliveira Sanfelice 
Université d’État de Campinas (UNICAMP) 
Abstract: The objective of this article is to offer an example of a work of art identified with what Paul Ricœur 
named polysemy or linguistic density. Some works of art exemplify a metaphoricity in their constitution 
and the metaphor would be a privileged model for the analysis of figurative art and of allusive figuration. I 
believe that the painting A Bigger Splash by David Hockney has an image game that is also a language 
game: the aesthetic figuration as semantic link between the verbal and the non-verbal, between the poetic 
and the pictorial. I argue that figuration through metaphoricity also exemplifies an ambiguity in Ricœur’s 
philosophy of language, and the distinction between the field of the pre-narrative and the narrative of the 
artwork clarify the aesthetic aspect of his theory of metaphor. The advantage of my example is that the 
immanent analysis of the metaphoric constitution of the work of art is compatible with the isolation of its 
narrative elements. The metaphoric redescription in painting should not be automatically extended to the 
narrative refiguration. 
Keywords: Art, Metaphor, Ricœur, Aesthetic, and Image. 
Résumé: L'objectif de cet article est d’offrir un exemple d’œuvre d'art correspondant à ce que Paul Ricœur a 
appelé la polysémie ou la densité linguistique. Certaines œuvres d'art exemplifient une métaphoricité dans 
leur constitution et la métaphore serait un modèle privilégié pour l'analyse de l'art figuratif et de la 
figuration allusive. Je crois que le tableau ”A Bigger Splash,” de David Hockney, présente un jeu d’images 
qui est aussi un jeu de langage: la figuration esthétique comme articulation sémantique du verbal et du non-
verbal, du poétique et du pictural. Je défends l’idée selon laquelle le caractère métaphorique de la figuration 
met aussi en relief une ambiguïté dans la philosophie du langage de Ricœur, et que la distinction entre le 
champ d’application pré-narratif et le narratif de l’œuvre d'art permet d'éclaircir l'aspect esthétique de sa 
théorie de la métaphore. L'avantage de mon exemple c’est que l'analyse immanente de la constitution 
métaphorique de l'œuvre d'art est compatible avec l'isolement de ses éléments narratifs. Dans la peinture, la 
redescription métaphorique ne doit pas être automatiquement étendue à la refiguration narrative. 
Mots-clés: Art, Métaphore, Ricœur, Esthétique, Image. 
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Vinicius Sanfelice 
Introduction 
 Paul Ricœur did not write an aesthetical theory in the strict sense, even his poetics 
comprises of hermeneutic studies about the surplus of meaning phenomenon that differ among 
themselves, like the symbol, the metaphor and the narrative. However, even the spread of these 
studies across articles and interviews did not prevent the use of common notions to characterize 
an aesthetic experience: redescription of the real, refiguration of the world, mimêsis. In “Lógique 
herméneutique’?” aesthetic experience is related to the specific problem of hermeneutics with its 
own tradition and the capacity to epistemologically uphold its judgements.2 In the article in 
question, the aesthetic experience of understanding reveals itself as an alternative to the criticisms 
that hermeneutics has received from the critical social sciences and from analytic philosophy of 
language. What is relevant, in Ricœur’s answer, is the possibility of hermeneutics being 
something directed to a “comprehensive experience” verbal or non-verbal. The example given of 
this experience is aesthetic pleasure. 
His position on the Gadamer-Habermas debate also attests to his effective interest in the 
critical capacity of hermeneutics—he would subscribe to Gadamer’s urbanization of the 
Heideggerian province as a starting point, but would reiterate the subordination of the 
epistemological to the ontological plane as an obstacle. However, it was difficult for Ricœur to 
move away from the “voie courte.” In his hermeneutics, distanciation is relatively autonomous 
and allows for a certain level of objectivity, but belonging to a tradition takes precedence over 
any critical distance. For him, we need to recognize both our inherent belonging to tradition and 
to the “critique of ideologies.” One question that must be asked regarding the aesthetic 
dimension of Ricœurian hermeneutics is whether moving away from ontological radicalization 
by taking a détour through the works is sufficient to achieve the required critical distance. This 
question stems from the distance that Ricœur takes from Heidegger and Gadamer when 
establishing a detour through the phenomenon of excess meaning. In this article, Ricœur’s 
suggestion of a “comprehensive experience” is analyzed from the visualization promoted by 
semantic innovation. I will address the role of metaphor and metaphoricity in aesthetic 
figuration. That is, the semantic innovation that occurs in the metaphorical statement will be 
examined based on the demand for interpretation that this statement makes upon the 
imagination. Seeking a better understanding of the figurative aspect of the metaphor, I search for 
an example of metaphoricity in the work of art that allows for an analysis of the semantic 
articulation of the image. The example should also allow us to distinguish between the pre-
narrative and narrative aspects of semantic innovation. The goal is to conceive of a different—and 
autonomous—figuration process than the configuration inspired by narrative. The tensing 
experience that is characteristic of metaphorical figuration promotes an impertinence and differs 
from the ordering experience of the mise-en-intrigue narrative. My hypothesis is that both 
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readings of A Bigger Splash presented in this article help to clarify a conflict within a “vast poetic 
sphere.” Ricœurian theory of metaphor employs a Heideggerian vocabulary that causes some 
commentators to see it as a shift from a “surplus of meaning” to a “surplus of being.” This 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that the intelligibility of metaphorical reference is 
important for the aesthetic dimension of Ricœurian hermeneutics. The way we choose to present 
it is to contrast the “voir-comme” with the “être-comme”—that is, we look for a mediation 
between them, which does not imply that the former submits to the latter. In this sense, 
Ricœurian hermeneutics would be able to find another ground for the conflict of interpretations, 
which would allow us to analyze its relationship with tradition, taking the work of art as a 
starting point. 
I) The “generalized metaphor” and the figuration through metaphoricity 
Ricœurian theory of metaphor is linked to contemporary semantics through its 
interpretation of the Aristotelian definition of transference (epiphora.) Unlike a tradition that 
promotes a theory of denomination, and a substitution between the literal sense and the 
figurative sense, the metaphorical statement is explained by a theory of the tension between the 
terms—semantic impertinence is a phenomenon of predication. There is a conflict of 
interpretations in the terms and the reader builds a figurative resolution. This resolution process 
is identified with a way of seeing, an insight associated with the iconic function of metaphor. The 
metaphor works as a visualization device to construct images through statements. This 
“language to image path” uses the structure of productive imagination as a model for how to 
treat the verbal aspect of the image. The metaphor reveals the image—in both its poetic and 
rhetorical dimensions—as discourse production and visualization power: it “sets something 
before the eyes.” This power of visualization comprehends the image as a possibility of the 
creative and aesthetic aspects of language.3 Unlike a tradition that regards the image as the 
vestige of perception, or which emphasizes the restitution of an absent thing, Ricœur sees a 
reversal in the Kantian distinction between the reproductive and productive aspects of the 
imagination. The emphasis on the productive aspect of the imagination is essential to the 
Ricœurian theory of metaphor—the semantic description of the imagination is only possible 
through this reading of the Kantian schematism doctrine. Imagination could—finally—be treated 
as a dimension of language. Ricœur thus assumes a connection between the “voir-comme” of 
metaphor and the power of imagination. The visualization of similarity through the metaphorical 
statement is precisely the construction of similarity through verbal and visual invention. 
Ricœur seeks to overcome the treatment of imagination based on perception and link it to 
the verbal aspect of image, thus establishing a schematism of metaphorical attribution. As the end 
product of a semantic theory, the image is now shaped according to its meaning. The semantic 
bias of imagination must be comprehended as a “seeing-as”—maintaining ambiguity via the 
imaginary. Linked to an intuitive act, “seeing-as” is fundamental for the pictorial function of 
language. The image that emerges from that link is not an image-copy that restores an absent 
thing. It is present in the redescription process, which itself is the result of the metaphorical 
process, as heuristic fiction. The iconic augmentation, which will be compared to the work of a 
painter, is a formula to build the image: 
A Bigger Splash to the Narrative  
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 9, No 1 (2018)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2018.360    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
92 
It is from this iconicity proper to the predicative assimilation that we can perceive the 
image’s game. It is not an associated image, as an image evoked and developed by the 
schematization of the metaphorical attribution. What does the image add to the 
information? Two things, essentially: in the first place, the image bears in itself its 
dimension of the unreality of fiction […] the poetic language is this game of language in 
which the intention of words is to evoke, originate images. The sense is iconic due to this 
power of revealing itself through images. The image plays, then, its double valence: as a 
suspension of the real it sets the dimension of fiction; as a flow of representations it inserts 
the sense in the almost-perceived depth. […] However, this horizon of metaphor 
philosophy can achieve only through long analysis, which still concerns the destiny of 
image. Indeed, it is still needed to fight the preconception that the suspension through 
image means simply the removal of all reference. As the comparison between metaphor 
and model suggests, the poetical fiction still has a referential dimension, that is, its power 
to re-describe reality.4 
In “The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality,” Ricœur is clear about the need to link 
image, fiction and work; painting emerges as an example of the productive aspect of the 
imagination – a paradigm of the power of fiction to change reality when inserted in a work. In 
another text, the polysemy present in the metaphor, compared to certain configurations of works 
of art, is defined as a linguistic form in which “several levels of meaning are held together in a 
single expression […] integrating levels of sense that are overlaid, preserved and contained 
together.”5 The example he uses is Nuclear Energy, a sculpture by Henry Moore located at the 
University of Chicago, above the laboratory where the first controlled nuclear reaction took place. 
It was described as polysemic for representing several possibilities—the skull of a scholar, an 
exploding atom, the Earth itself – and for having the capacity to enhance meanings by 
condensing them. Besides the fact that the sculpture has been described as polyfigurative, I 
consider it an inadequate example because it is not clear whether it is the effect of the work of art 
that we can compare with the metaphor. Ricœur says little about its cause and about the 
structurally metaphorical nature of the work of art, only that it represents many possible figures. 
Another problem is that these figures relate to contextual, external factors: the place where the 
work of art is located, what happened there, who was responsible for the action (e.g., the 
scientist.) 
An analysis of the figurative work of art or of the allusive figuration based on 
metaphoricity becomes progressively more difficult as it moves beyond this comparison between 
sculpture and a “generalized metaphor.” Ricœur also affirms that there is a singular figuration in 
each work, a structure rendered comprehensible by language even when it is supposedly absent, 
as in music. By saying that Cézanne never paints the same mountain, and that the painter makes 
an addition to the pure representation of an object, Ricœur argues that the iconic augmentation 
communicated by the painting promotes a break from reality. However, could the idea of 
addition as a pictorial function also be extended to non-figurative painting? The absence of 
figuration is important, as it signals a withdrawal from reality in which the function of 
representation is more fragile, or even nonexistent: 
One could say that nonfigurative painting freed what was in reality already the properly 
aesthetic dimension of the figurative, a dimension that remained veiled by the function of 
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representation that fell to pictorial art. And it is when the concern with the internal 
composition alone was disconnected from the representative function that the function of 
manifestation of a world was rendered explicit; representation once abolished, it becomes 
obvious that the work expresses the world in a manner other than by representing it; it 
expresses it by iconizing the singular emotional relation of the artist to the world, which I 
have called the mood.6 
A game of non-verbal language or a logic based on the pictorial image are apparently not 
enough to make this a coherent extension. Another problem is the notion that all works of art, 
including musical pieces, correspond to a “mood,” a lost emotion that is restored by the work. 
The challenge lies in knowing what kind of figuration would be present in those état d’âme, or 
what it means to open an emotional space where the feelings are figurative; and whether it is at 
all necessary to talk about the transfiguration of feelings. 
 When treating the figuration of metaphor as a discourse strategy for discussing an 
aesthetic experience—knowing that its tensive structure refers to the oscillation between 
semantics and ontology—, I take some methodological precautions. Not ignoring the return path 
to symbolic opacity is one of them. Another and more important precaution is not to rush 
through the trajectory between The Rule of Metaphor (henceforth, RM) and Time and Narrative 
(henceforth, TR,) disregarding the notion that these are twin works that deal with the same 
phenomena of semantic innovation. This is done so as not to overburden the treatment of 
innovation in the discussion on tropes with the problems of a phenomenology of reading that is 
directed towards historiography, temporality, narrative identity and an ethical opening. 
Although narrative refiguration could be understood as a particular application of metaphorical 
reference, the phenomenology of reading in RM is merely implicit. One assumption that must be 
questioned is that the theory of reading is added because of the problematic nature of 
metaphorical reference. In order to question this assumption—and, more importantly, to 
differentiate between the experience of metaphor and the emplotment in aesthetical dimension of 
Ricœurian poetics—, the discussion has to adopt the vocabulary that would allow the glissement 
of “seeing-as” to “being-as.” By questioning an inevitable solution that would allow the theory of 
metaphor to reach the practical roots of a langagière creation, I understand that the vocabulary 
used by Ricœur indicates his participation in a specific hermeneutic thesis and the philosophy of 
language found in such thesis. Regarding the work of art, I argue that figuration through 
metaphoricity can shed light on two different approaches to the question of language—perhaps 
we should identify the first as being closer to late Heidegger, while the second is closer to a 
concern for the epistemological aspects of metaphorical reference. 
II) Metaphoricity and Arts of language  
 It seems to me that the attempts to attest to the unity of the phenomenon of a surplus 
of meaning and to suggest the outlines of an aesthetical theory based on such unity, run into the 
problem of hesitating between the two different approaches mentioned above. Before I provide 
my example of metaphoricity in a work of art, I will analyze some of these attempts, given that 
some solutions have been suggested for what I refer to as the hesitation between continuing the 
inquiry into the question of Being and the risk of breaking from hermeneutics. In “L’unité de la 
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‘vaste sphère poétique’,” for example, Yvon Inizan reaffirms a poetic unity through the heuristic 
function of “mood” and generalized reference.7 He understands that there is a methodological 
prudence in Ricœurian analysis—a circumscription to certain objects that, nonetheless, does not 
prevent a future expansion. That is, we could comprehend these objects together or within an 
analysis that includes a reflection on art. He also argues that the move from “metaphor” to 
“narrative” affirms the poetic unity by more than just the mere recognition of a gémellité between 
MV and TR. The application of metaphorical reference to the human action dimension is 
supported by the suggestion that “seeing-as” unveils “being-as.”8 The question is to determine 
whether this unity, which refers to a “creative act,” also unveils a horizon for a reflection on the 
work of art. 
In his article, Inizan defends a complementarity between the feeling articulated by a 
poem (an approach that provides the vocabulary for the “mood”) and generalized reference. 
According to the author, the privilege given to narration to the detriment of lyrical poetry—or, in 
the synthesis of creative imagination, of a new plot to the detriment of a new pertinence—reveals 
an imbalance that stems from a reaction to the Heideggerian hierarchy between poetry and 
literature. This reaction supposedly led Ricœur to defend the novel. Following Inizan’s argument, 
the division of functions between metaphor and narrative seems restricted to the metaphorical 
field. It is the refiguration of the plot that temporarily structures the action—in other words, the 
plot combines both passivity and action. Nonetheless, the development of a “tensional” concept 
of truth suggests that the reaction was timid and did not prevent Ricœur from seeing the 
metaphorical redescription as a condition of inhabiting the world.9 For Inizan, the horizon for 
reflection on art is opened by a dialectics in which a denotative theory of metaphor would correct 
the suspected subjectivity of a “state of mind” expressed by a poem. He understands that there is 
an effort of complementarity in the meeting between the theories of poetic congruence and of 
generalized denotation (the respective approaches of Frye and of Goodman.) 
 The relationship between the epoché of reference and the subsequent redescription 
would designate the dual orientation—emotional and descriptive—of the poetic act. This 
metaphorical synthesis offers elements for the answer to the problem of the unity of the “vaste 
sphère poétique.” The unity in the field of poetical composition becomes apparent when we 
compare it to the poetic act that produces the muthos. In the seventh chapter of MV, “Métaphore 
et reference,” the articulation between mimesis and muthos is used to compare lyrical poetry with 
tragic poetry, through an association between metaphoricity and the plot of the tale.10 Inizan 
follows this articulation to affirm that the difference between lyrical poetry and tragic poetry is 
that the production of “mise en intrigue” is more apparent in the second one. It is also important 
to follow the displacement of the “hypothetical created by the poem” from tragic poetry to lyrical 
poetry—that is, from muthos to “mood.” This is where Ricœur suggests this as a model for 
“seeing-as” and for “feeling-as”: 
The mood is no less heuristic than fiction in the form of a story […]. If this heuristic 
function of mood is so difficult to recognize, it is doubtless because ‘representation’ has 
become the sole route to knowledge and the model of every relationship between subject 
and object. Yet feeling has an ontological status different from relationship at a distance; it 
makes for participation in things.11  
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This heuristic function of “mood” refers to the ontological dimension of feeling, to the 
affective tonality in a Heideggerian sense. Thus, the tension between fiction and redescription 
caused by the metaphorical statements would refer to an experience of reality that combines 
manifestation and creation. Inizan uses this experience as his starting point to arrive at the 
reflection on the work of art in Critique and Conviction—which would constitute a two-way 
encounter between language and art resulting from the comparison with sculpture.12 If Ricœur’s 
methodological prudence restricts his analysis to certain creative activities, that does not prevent 
the analysis from expanding its frontiers to other operations—“vers l’ensemble des operations de 
configuration et le refiguration.”13 The dialectics that Inizan proposes as fundamental in relation 
to poetic and tensive figures of metaphor and narrative is between the “position” and “l’accueil.” 
It is in this dialectics that the meeting between creation and revelation takes place, and this is also 
where the reflection about “seeing,” which is also “doing,” receives the treatment of the “seeing-
as” exposed in MV. Most importantly, this is where the relationship between this seeing/doing 
with the “attestation de l’être comme” is highlighted.14  
 It seems to me that if the attestation is the endpoint of the reference of metaphorical 
statements there should be neither a hesitation per se, nor a risk of breaking from hermeneutics. 
But then how should we understand the demand for rigor in the reference analysis that is put 
together with this attestation? The difficult part in the poetic feeling proposition—the reciprocity 
of the inner and the outer that the metaphor would transform from something confusing into a 
bipolar tension—is precisely the glissement of “seeing-as” to “being-as.” The insistence in the 
eclipse of ordinary reference turns “mood” into the moment in which the “expérience 
d’appartenance” is more prominent and the “pouvoir de distanciation” is less capable of being 
dialectically justified. The “feeling-as” related to the “mood” becomes an obstacle to the 
intelligibility conquered through the theory of metaphorical reference. This intelligibility is an 
important element that allows us to question the notions of “truth” and “reality,” and at the same 
time seek an explanation for phenomena whose reference is not ostensive. In this sense, it 
determines Ricœur’s place in the hermeneutic tradition, with the explanation being offered as a 
complement to interpretation. 
 A question to be asked is whether an extension of metaphoricity could divert from a 
metaphorical reading of affects, or if it could take on a different sense other than an aesthetic of 
affective metaphorization of emotions. Eugene F. Kaelin may have been the first to link 
metaphoricity to the aesthetic pleasure experience.15 Analyzing the extension to the aesthetic use 
of discourse, together with the triple mimesis, he suggests a scheme of comprehension that 
accompanies metaphoricity in the schematization of the feeling generated by works of art, and in 
the ontological postulate of poetry. In his reading of MV, more exactly in the Ricœurian reading 
of Beardsley, a poem acquires signification when it is organized as a “representational world” 
through the dimension of meaning, the intelligibility of its verbal design, and the plane of 
reference. This constitutes the “metaphorics of fiction” that is later extended beyond poetry. 
 Most of Kaelin’s critique of Ricœur revolves around his reading of Poetics. In it, Kaelin 
says, the catharsis is limited to the intellectual role of comprehension in the pleasure that the 
spectator of tragedy experiences. He also mentions the recognized problem of circularity in the 
refiguration experience, that is, that mimesis 3 is already contained in the structure of mimesis 1. 
However, he goes further by suggesting a non-metaphorical reading of reference based on 
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semiotics, in which the tension of metaphorical reference is literally comprehended as 
“describing the state of our consciousness as we ‘live’ within the universe of the work of art.”16 
 The answers given to Eugene F. Kaelin’s criticism are significant for a consideration of 
the limits of aesthetic pleasure. In a rereading of his own theory, Ricœur describes the 
metaphorization of emotions as the phenomenon in which they are retained and superseded in 
the aesthetic experience. He affirms that the concept of metaphoricity is expanded and enriched 
trough catharsis, but suggests that the prominence of pleasure in the metaphorization of 
emotions would be more appropriate in an analysis of tragic pleasure. Ricœur questions the fact 
that the aesthetic dimension of metaphoricity is restricted to pleasure, and inquires about the 
possibility of “a vaster idea of metaphoricity itself, and hence of the pleasure attached to it.”17 
Starting with the notion of the “world of the text” and the refiguration of the reader’s experience, 
he reaffirms both the extension of metaphoricity to the narrative theory as well as the specificity 
of metaphor. And, in fact, he expresses a belief in some kind of poetic unity: 
The separate treatment of these procedures should not mask what is at issue in a 
metaphorization, which is expected to include narrative fictionalization within its poetic 
space. Should one not therefore say that the ultimate referent of aesthetic pleasure is the 
creativity common to the metaphorization of feelings and to the fictionalization of 
narrative plots? This would be the best way to give catharsis itself a scope equal to that of 
the metaphoricity that irrigates all the forms of semantic innovation, without thereby 
abolishing the characteristics proper to tragic catharsis.18 
Of all the difficulties concerning the “surplus of meaning” experience, the last one 
remaining is the statute of truth in poetic creations. Apparently, we return to the same problem of 
understanding what this “truth” and its consequent “experience” are. The search for poetic unity 
through “mood” and reference is explicit as to the possibility of a reflection on the work of art, 
but we could choose other starting points. 
 The work of metaphor together with productive imagination is an articulation of the 
fictional; it results in a fictionalization of reality. Poetic creativity is a part of it, but so too is 
utopia as well as the surplus of meaning in the evangelical discourse and the common 
representation of history and narrative. In Symbole, métaphore et récit: le statut du fictionnel chez 
Ricœur, Jean Luc-Amalric researches the genesis of the fictional and its importance for the unity of 
a creativity matrix. In this reading, the interest in metaphor is to clarify the experience of a 
fictional schematism based on a general theory of imagination. Its contribution, when affirming 
that the metaphor represents the logical articulation of the fictional work of imagination is 
precisely to delimit it. It is true that he suggests that the reflection on the metaphor, still uprooted 
from praxis, advances toward the narrative to be complemented—in this case, both functions 
would complement the fictional. However, the methodological direction is what makes his work 
stand out; that is, rather than being an interpretation that expands the virtual aspect of narrative 
to other phenomena, it is a “return inquiry” (Rückfrage) that seeks to lay the foundation for 
metaphoricity and narrativity on an implicit or immanent symbolism. The possibility is that 
metaphoricity includes the update of virtuality indicated by the reservation of meaning, by the 
implicit symbolic meaning. 
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 In Amalric, we find the proposition for a dialectics between a virtual fictional (pre-
reflexive) and an actual fictional (the semantic and reflexive work of poetic imagination.) He 
affirms that a virtual metaphoricity would precede all metaphorical invention, and that this 
process involves a fictional imagination and an “almost” fictional experience, both verbal and 
non-verbal: 
As Ricœur shows, the metaphorical “seeing-as” is the translation of an “imaginative 
function of language” capable of intuitively linking the sense and the image, the semantics 
and the sensitive. It is, at the same time, an experience that affects us—to the extent that the 
wave of images escapes all voluntary acts—, and an act that we perform—to the extent 
that the comprehension of a metaphor is an act of reading and interpretation which the 
iconic flux finds oriented and orderly. [...] thus appears that the fictional imagination 
operates a radical rupture with the order of the real. It is to the extent that this neutralization of 
the real is equivalent to the neutralization of a symbolism always there [neutralisation d’un 
symbolisme déjà là] which becomes, then, possible a refiguration of our experience.19 
The dialectics between the virtual and actual dimensions, essential to a general theory of 
imagination, is also essential for an aesthetic dimension based on the notion of metaphoricity—a 
signification that operates in a transgressive manner, albeit linked to a logos that can be explained, 
an explanation that should not be final and univocal, but rather should preserve its polysemy and 
intelligibility. It indicates that the reserve of meaning, the implicit symbolic, would be present in 
the work of art as updated metaphoricity. That would be my choice to supersede what Amalric 
calls the static treatment of metaphor, in which the practical potentialities of semantic innovation 
cannot be recognized. 
 I follow his proposition of deepening the reflection about metaphor towards the vive 
experience of the metaphorical truth.20 By connecting artistic figuration to metaphoricity in the 
work of art, I also believe that its importance depends on the relationship that it could establish 
with philosophical discourse. However, when we modify the ground for interpreting our 
existential relationship with the world, I think that we need to not only highlight the rejection of a 
direct ontology, but also consider the change in the vocabulary that describes it. As we saw, the 
unity of the creativity matrix crafted through a methodological change of direction, the aesthetic 
experience of figuration, as an innovation, demands its own autonomy. 
III) A Bigger Splash to the narrative: work-in-progress  
 This section presents two readings of A Bigger Splash and suggests an alternative to 
identifying the “mood” with an emotion that has been restored by the work of art based on an 
analysis of the painting. The “mood” reaffirms the ineffability of the work of art and its use 
would mark the hesitation between two vocabularies familiar to Ricœur—one of which identifies 
the “state of mind” as an ontological indicator of a way of being, rooted in the reality that he 
created/discovered; while the other identifies work and world, confronting the limitation of 
“mood” as a merely virtual hypothetical against the paradox of privileged poetic feeling. 
 In 1967, David Hockney painted A Bigger Splash, as part of a three-painting series 
made in California, in which he explored the representation of water as a singular question to be 
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answered.21 Faced with the difficulty in depicting the image of water—even taking a photograph 
of it seemed to him like trying to capture something that is entirely foreign—, Hockney 
introduces intelligibility in painting by alluding to a splash. He was not just interested in 
representation, but rather in some correlated questions or problems that concerned both the 
history of painting and the philosophy of art.22 That is how the white lines of A Bigger Splash 
constitute a singular answer—polysemic, irreducible to a mimetic representation of water: they 
cause a metaphorical redescription. We can follow those lines assuming that they delay—within 
the painting and in the viewer’s eye—integration in a textuality that is close to a narrative, in 
Hockney’s vocabulary, a “theatrical device.”23 While it may seem obvious that meaning in this 
painting is determined by the agent of the splash, the painter uses a figuration based on an 
absence. Part of this figuration is the semantic and pictorial impertinence: isolated, it is composed 
of a white blur brushed on a blue background, and the effect is on the edge of figurative 
allusion.24 The blur becomes the precise answer that Hockney found through his attempt to 
reverse the ephemerality of a splash of water by painting it as slowly as possible. The choice of 
the painting style, the color pallet, the painting’s composition—the durable elements of 
architecture, the ephemeral ones in nature—constitutes a style.25 It is the idea of style, something 
both technical and spiritual, that Ricœur gives precedence to in his old text about the work of 
art.26 The indirect exploitation of human beings by the work of art, the expression of a style, 
would look at physical matter as the technical solution for a problem, and at the spiritual 
projection in material symbols—the “mood” had not yet been incorporated into his vocabulary, 
the “possible world” of the painting had. 
I understand that the metaphoricity in a work could be isolated from its narrative 
elements, and that Hockney’s painting is an example of the figuration that occurs through the 
tensive structure of metaphor. In addition, it guides the sense and reference, even though the 
painting incorporates other elements. These other elements, in Ricœurian figuration, would 
update the virtual metaphoricity inscribed by the artist. There is a metaphorical redescription in 
the pre-narrative dimension of painting—a modeling of real experience in its allusive figuration. 
However, we could think of figuration as the affirmation of inhabiting or reorganizing the 
“world.” Keeping to the elements of the painting, I will assume that the edge of the pool is a 
dividing line between the element of allusion represented by the blur (of water) and the 
architectural element represented by the house. The house and its spatial disposition can be 
thought of as representation—although not by similarity—and also as habitation, in a 
phenomenological sense. Therefore, we can introduce the question of narrative refiguration, 
present in the triple mimesis, and suggest that this introduction provides an alternative (the 
opening of a world which I can inhabit) to reorganizing the world in terms of works. 
 In “Architecture and Narrativity,” Ricœur affirms the parallelism between the 
temporal inscription of narrative (the act of narrating) and the spatial edification of architecture 
(the act of constructing.) He suggests the possibility of interweaving both: narrative time 
configuring the experience of the past and the living present of the now, and constructed space as 
the place of life in the durability of the inhabitable. To address this temporality and this spatiality, 
the strategy is based on the three levels where the poetic mimesis operates until it corresponds 
with the act of inhabiting (pre-figuration,) the act of constructing (configuration,) and the re-
reading of our inhabiting places (refiguration.) At the first level, the pre-narrative, it corresponds 
to the vital necessity of humans to inhabit/construct this world—architectural operations built by 
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the dialectics of refuge and displacement that characterizes the most elementary level of life. A 
living space is needed so that a life story can unfold. At the second level, the narrative, a mise-en-
intrigue configures a plot, shapes events and provides intelligibility for the story being narrated, 
integrating it with others in an intertextuality. The correspondence that Ricœur establishes is 
between a temporal synthesis of the heterogeneous elements and a special synthesis present in 
the architecture—the architectural work as polyphonic message that requires a reading. It is at 
this level of intertextuality, of traditions transformed by the dialectics of innovation and tradition, 
that the work of architecture will be considered as an aesthetic and utopic project.  
 The narrative refiguration, the reception of a work provided by the reading, is the 
moment when the comprehension of itself identifies with the opening of a possible dimension. 
Spatially, it corresponds to habitation as a human answer: a reply to the act of constructing. It is 
the construction of the object as a literary text and as a place of memory that spatial 
intertextuality makes possible. Thus, the narrative element configured by Hockney’s work 
registers the invasion of modernist architecture in California. The story being narrated—half-
accusation, half-invitation—is that of the hedonistic lifestyle of the late 1960s.27 Thus, a 
phenomenology of reading could register the near mise-en-abyme of the architectural work within 
the painting. And it could, also, through the parallel between construction (hard physical matter 
available for viewing) and narration (a work of language available for reading), question it as an 
architectural project. In fact, Ricœur makes the comparison between the structuralism of 
language and the formalism of space a first reading key: an architectural project becomes a 
project of civilization, a proposition for how a city should be configured.28 A second reading 
indicates that the ideological aspect is present in the pretension of denying it through some sort 
of purism:  
That explains the reaction in the opposite direction of those who advocate a return to pure 
architecture, disconnected from all sociology and all social psychology, that is, from all 
ideology. We are then faced with a claim quite comparable to that which the theorists of 
the Nouveau Roman have raised, in the celebration of language, for its own glory, the 
‘words’ having dissociated themselves irrevocably from ‘things’ and representation giving 
place to game. Thus, narrativity and architecture follow similar historical courses.29 
Ricœur does not explicitly treat architecture as a work of art—in an architectural project, 
the practical function highlighted by ideology or by its outright denial prevails over the aesthetic 
function. However, questioning whether the critics of the architectural project reveal a 
conservative stance towards contemporary works is perfectly valid—in fact, the comparison with 
nouveau roman allows for it. The criteria of what is correct and incorrect when interpreting a work 
– Nelson Goodman’s proposition for a constructive relativism—suggests a retreat to a different 
dialectics, or to two key moments for interpretation. Deconstruction as a prelude to a 
“reconstruction” serves to move away from the absolutist viewpoint that the work represents the 
architect’s intentions, and from the deconstructionist position and its interpretative 
inconsequence, in which one interpretation is worth as much as any other.30  
 Goodman’s approach towards architecture in How Buildings Mean, in which he 
defends a neutral analysis between the arts and other symbolical systems such as science, 
incorporates the practical and aesthetic functions of the building within the symbolic function. 
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His approach is very similar to that of Ricœur, especially the priority given to reference in his 
analysis. Promoting the language for its own sake or preaching in the name of a pure art, free of 
any symbolism, as they both compare, is to take a restricted notion of reference as basis. The 
vocabulary of denotation and metaphorical expression conjures up the churches, which represent 
through the characteristics possessed and exemplified by the building—for Goodman, these are 
the main forms of representation through buildings. The intersection of ogives, which Ricœur 
mentions in his article of 1957, can be thought of as the metaphorical dynamics of the gothic 
cathedral that elevates and exalts based on the distinction between metaphorical truth and literal 
falsity. Ricœur is updated on this vocabulary in the example of the color that exemplifies grey 
and expresses sorrow. For paintings or buildings, as works of art, there is an exemplification of 
literal or metaphorical proprieties (expression.) Goodman is concerned with architectural works, 
and is not thinking of figurative buildings inside other works of art. Having said that, and going 
back to the rereading that Ricœur offers of his symbolic theory, we can note an important 
difference between the semantic innovation of metaphor and narrative, one that is remembered 
by Amalric: that the former brings an element of disorder, and the latter, an element of order. 
Isn’t this distinction relevant for an analysis of contemporary works of art, which so often lean 
towards the avant-garde or a break from tradition?31 
 The metaphor inserted into the problem of reference, of the literally false and the 
metaphorically true, allows for a second interpretation of modernist house figuration created by 
Hockney. If, as Ricœur affirms, reference and denotation could be treated as synonymous (the 
language describes, the art represents) when different labels are applied, a new distinction is 
introduced to deal with the orientation of reference. It can now go both from the symbol to things 
as well as from things to the symbol. It is how a painting exemplifies grey—it designates a 
possession of the grey predicate—to express sorrow: the metaphor as a transfer operation of a non-
verbal predicate. An entire scheme for metaphoricity emerges when exemplification and 
denotation are identified as cases of reference production, which differ only in their specific 
directions. In painting, the metaphorically sad is the predicative use in an inverted denotation. 
Ricœur complements generalized reference with the theory of models and his concept of heuristic 
fiction.32 With the idea of general reference, we can think of figuration in my example in the 
following manner: the figure of the house possesses the lines of modernist architecture, it 
exemplifies a modernist house—not like many modernist houses built in California in the late 
1950s, but one that is singularized by the painter’s style. The lines denote the house, they 
comprise a sample of their characteristics, but this literal exemplification is accompanied by 
metaphoric exemplification—that is, by the expression of hedonism that accompanies both the 
composition of objects and the allusive figuration of the splash. It is an inverted denotation: the 
house is denoted by what it exemplifies. The metaphorical application of a symbol is the kind of 
transference that allows us to speak of colors as sounds by extending “figures” to the “schemes.” 
The key for understanding this transference is provided by Ricœur’s reading of Goodman:  
A painting expresses properties that it exemplifies metaphorically in virtue of its status as 
pictorial symbol: “Pictures are no more immune than the rest of the world to the 
formative force of language even though they themselves, as symbols, also exert such a 
force upon the world, including language”.33 
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There are advantages to generalized reference theory. From both an aesthetic and poetic 
point of view, the main advantage is that, in the expression of representations, the qualities now 
belong to things and are no longer considered subjective effects experienced by the spectator. The 
disadvantage, which requires hermeneutic complements to the pragmatist and nominalist aspects 
of this theory, is that, without exploring the possibilities of null denotation, Goodman does not 
realize the capacity for ontological vehemence of the works of art—something that the union 
of fiction and redescription allows us to do when it is included in the theory of metaphor. 
 It was in his defense of an ontological vehemence that Paul Ricœur found the paradox 
of the tensive character between literal truth and metaphorical truth. To believe that the 
(metaphorical) “is” is a determination and not an equivalence would leads us to an ontological 
naivety by ignoring the “is not” (literal); it would amount to considering metaphor as an innocent 
artifice, overlooking the fact that its heuristic function “[…] tends to lose sight of its nature as 
fiction and take on the dimensions of perceptual belief.”34 According to Ricœur, the application 
of a critical indicator to the fictional “as if” is the level of consciousness we reach when putting on 
the mask of metaphor, rather than to deny it. The mere literary artifice prevents us from 
becoming conscious of the violence embedded in interpretation and lying. A negative answer to 
the paradox is not the solution. We need to accept the invitation extended by the poetic, while 
renouncing the “as if” of ontological naivety.  
 Regarding the example of metaphoricity in works of art, both readings of A Bigger 
Splash are not complementary and exemplify yet another theoretical incompatibility.35 However, 
a definition of a work of art that is compatible with this poetics is an excellent starting point for a 
hermeneutics of the “comprehensive experience.” Developing the analysis in the direction of the 
power of the ontological revelation of works of art increases the risk of it collapsing into a form of 
unintelligibility, that is characteristic of the hermeneutics of revelation. We know that, at the end 
of MV, “seeing-as” is complemented by “being-as”—and the metaphorical reference moves in 
this direction. Was there some hesitation? It is understandable to suppose that this hesitation was 
brief, and that a continuation of the reflection on metaphor and narrative should be understood 
as a furthering of such reflection into the ontological mode of the unconcealment of a world that I 
can inhabit. Then we should be prepared to assume that, when searching for an aesthetic 
dimension in Ricœurian hermeneutics, we will only find his promised poetics. 
 
1 This paper would not have been possible without the support from the São Paulo Research Foundation 
(FAPESP) who provided me with funding via the grant 2015/27009-3. I thank Gilson Olegario da Silva 
and the two anonymous reviewers for the lots of valuable comments on the article.  
2 See Paul Ricœur, “‘Logique herméneutique’?,” In Écrits et conférences 2. Herméneutique, ed. Daniel Frey 
and Nicola Stricker, Paris, Seuil, 2010, pp. 123-196.  
3 “Picture thinking” describes the pictorial power of language. Thus, in the construction of the 
metaphorical sense, the verbal icon is understood as a hard object similar to the sculpture. On the 
other hand, from the viewpoint of the image: “Consequently, to form an image is not to have an 
image, in the sense of having a mental representation; instead, it is to read, through the icon of a 
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relation, the relation itself. Image is less 'associated' than evoked and displayed by the 
schematization. Language remains the bearer of the predicative relation, but in schematizing and 
illustrating itself in a pictorial manner, the predicative relation can be read through the image in which 
it is invested. The seeing created by language is therefore not a seeing of this or that; it is a ‘seeing-
as’”. Paul Ricœur, “The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality,” In A Ricœur Reader: Reflection and 
Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdes (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991,) 127. 
4 Paul Ricœur, “Cinque lezioni. Dal linguaggio all’immagine,” In Aesthetica Preprint 66, ed. Rita Messori 
(Palermo: Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, 2002), 60-61. “Cinque lezioni. Dal linguaggio 
all’immagine” is the edition of Lectures conducted by Paul Ricœur between 1973 and 1974 at the 
Centre de Recherches Phénoménologiques de Paris in a seminar named “Phenomenological Research 
on the Imaginary”. The Lectures was firstly published in Italian under the curatorship of Rita Messori. 
One translation into Portuguese was published in 2013: “Cinco lições: da linguagem à imagem,” In 
Sapere Aude, nº 4 (2013): 12-36. Translated by Vinicius Sanfelice and Marcelo Fabri. 
5 “This would be comparable to the density of certain forms of language, such as metaphor, in which 
several levels of meaning are held together in a single expression. The work of art can have an effect 
comparable to that of metaphor: integrating levels of sense that are overlaid, preserved and 
contained together.” Paul Ricœur, Critique and Conviction (New York: Columbia University Press. 
1998,) 172. 
6 Ricœur, Critique and Conviction, 181. 
7 See: Yvon Inizan, “L’unité de la ‘vaste sphère poétique’,” Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies 7, nº 2 
(2016), 111-113. Accessed March 10, 2017. DOI: 10.5195/errs.2016.384. 
8 Paul Ricœur, Temps et récit, t. 1, L’intrigue et le récit historique, Paris, Seuil, 1983, p. 13. 
9 Inizan, “L’unité de la ‘vaste sphère poétique’,” pp. 112-113. 
10See: “… because, on the one hand, the muthos takes the form of a ‘story’ and the metaphoricity is 
attached to the plot of the tale, and because, on the other hand, the referent consists in human action 
which, due to its motivational course, has a certain affinity to the structure of the story”. Paul Ricœur, 
The Rule of Metaphor, trans. by Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004,) 289.  
11 Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 290. 
12 See note 5. 
13 Inizan, “L’unité de la ‘vaste sphère poétique’,” 120. 
14 See: “Je me risque à dire que, voir quelque chose comme, c’est rendre manifeste l’être-comme de la 
chose. Je mets le ‘comme’ en position d’exposant du verbe être et je fais de ‘lêtre-comme le référent 
ultime de l’énonce métaphorique. Cette thèse porte incontestablementl’empreinte de l’ontologie post-
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heideggérienne”. Paul Ricœur, Du texte à l’action. Essais d’herméneutique II, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 
1986, 34. 
15 See: Eugene F. Kaelin, “Paul Ricœur’s aesthetics: on how to read a metaphor,” In The philosophy of 
Paul Ricœur, ed. by Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1995): 237-255. 
16 Kaelin, “Paul Ricœur’s aesthetics: on how to read a metaphor,” 253. 
17 Kaelin, “Paul Ricœur’s aesthetics: on how to read a metaphor,” 257. 
18 Kaelin, “Paul Ricœur’s aesthetics: on how to read a metaphor,” 258. As in the previous note, Ricœur 
answered to Kaelin’s criticisms on these pages. 
19 Jean-Luc Amalric, “Símbolo, metáfora e narrativa: o estatuto do ficcional em Ricœur,” In Pensar 
Ricœur: vida e narração, eds. by Roberto Wu and Cláudio Reichert do Nascimento (Porto Alegre: 
Clarinete, 2016,) 162. 
20 See also: Jean-Luc Amalric, “L’épreuve de la métaphore: élements pour une critique du discours 
philosophique,” Remate de Males 35, nº 2 (2015): 423. 
21 A Bigger Splash, 1967, Acrylic on canvas, 243.8 X 243.8 cm (96 X 96 in). Tate, London. The two 
paintings are The Little Splash and The Splash (1966). 
22 About California and life-style: “The work of Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg from the late fifties 
raised serious questions that undermined ‘common sense’ ideas concerning the difference between 
the visual and the linguistic, the figurative and the abstract, illusion and reality. The ways in which 
modern art was thought about and defined continued to preoccupy Hockney in California […] his work 
demonstrates his excitement at the way objects can be represented by signs that hardly resemble 
them. In paintings, prints and drawings, he worked his way through a whole series of different types 
of sign, nowhere more abundantly than in the depictions of transparent surfaces, such as water [a 
bigger splash]. What we see is a great variety of decorative marks, abstract coloured shapes and 
carefully delineated contours. Our delight in seeing how these unnaturalistic signs can, indeed do, 
represent water is a consequence of the artist’s intelligence and wit.” Paul Melia and Ulrich Luckhardt, 
David Hockney Paintings (Munich—London—New York: Prestel Verlag, 2000,) 56. 
23 This point about Hockney’s vocabulary, as procedure of modern painting, can be understood as a 
specific insertion into the debate about modernism and minimalism. The painter would also be 
inserted in what Ricœur calls a verbal culture, which is key to understanding the possible answers to 
the problem—in this case, the abstractionism and the minimalist object (and its theatricality.) 
According to Melia and Luckhardt, Hockney would overcome this dichotomy both in the representation 
of buildings as in the temporal involvement with some “theatricality.” It is also in this sense, I believe, 
that we can say that a work of art can propose an inquiry—figuring—into conceptual problems 
concerning philosophical theories. 
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24 See: “A Bigger Splash could be considered figurative in the sense that there was a figure who’s just 
gone under the water. The splash must have been made by something; presumably it was made by a 
figure. But if you take away the chair, for instance, and the reflection in the glass, it becomes much 
more abstract. You could even take away the glass, and then it becomes even more so; no colour—
absolutely flat”. David Hockney, David Hockney by David Hockney: My Early Years (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1976), 126. An affirmation that can be compared with this (on the part of the viewer): 
“What leaves me with reservations about it [figurative/non-figurative] is the narrative assumption of 
most of the canvases [Poussin painting’s]. One has to be able to identify the stories being staged. But 
the eye educated by nonfigurative painting only manages to see the extraordinary play of color and of 
line and the perfect balance of the two.” Ricœur, Critique and Conviction, 178. 
25 “[Hockney about style]: ‘I want to use different styles, or a vocabulary of different styles, in the same 
way a writer uses different words. I think it is part of the technique of painting to be able to adapt 
yourself to different styles…’ […] Hockney’s self-consciousness about style, and his interest in using 
one that did not betray individuality, indicates that the received idea of style as an index of the artist’s 
inner self could no longer facilitate a full, imaginative engagement: it was capable of giving rise only 
to work characterized by visual cliché.” Melia and Luckhardt, David Hockney Paintings, 32-38. 
26 “La place de l’oeuvre d’art dans notre culture” was published in 1957, in the journal Foi & Education 38. 
The definition of “mood” based on Cézanne’s paintings does not clarify the nature of the process of 
iconic augmentation. On the contrary, a provisional definition limited to the notion of style allows us 
to understand that it is as figuration inserted into the work due to its style that iconic augmentation 
becomes a singular response provided by the artist. 
27 “For an artist as preoccupied with surfaces as Hockney, L.A. and specially Hollywood (which has derived 
great rewards from exhibiting itself) provide an ideal setting. Here, reality had been turned into 
images so often that it was, and still is, sometimes difficult to distinguish between image and reality. 
Hence the artist’s comment: “I love California. Everything is so artificial.” Melia and Luckhardt, David 
Hockney Paintings, 61. 
28 “There is also the fact that, in a still recent past, from which current builders endeavor to distance 
themselves, the members of the Bauhaus school, those loyal to Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier, 
thought their art of building in connection with the values of civilization to which they adhered, 
according to the place they assigned to their art in the history of culture”. Paul Ricœur, “Architecture 
and Narrativity.” Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies, Vol 7, No 2 (2016): 38. 
29 Ricœur, “Architecture and Narrativity,” 38. 
30 See: Nelson Goodman, “How Buildings Mean,” Critical Inquiry 11, nº 4 (1985): 650. 
31 This aesthetic subversive relationship was better understood by Alberto Martinengo. He expands the 
dialectics between innovation and sedimentation to artistic revolutions. Just as, in metaphorical 
language, the meaning emerges from the rubble of contradiction, the new canon (its best example is 
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the avant-garde) comes from an ordered violation of the traditional artistic paradigm. It emerges as a 
consequence of metaphorical reference, of the moment in which the metaphor produces a second 
reference to the world, expanding or transforming the structure of artistic movements. If, in symbolic 
systems, the violation is an evolutionary process that redefines its boundaries in continuity and 
innovation, in artistic styles the processes of innovation and sedimentation act as laboratories that 
insert a new canon without eradicating the previous one. The vanguard, exemplified here by 
Kandinsky’s abstractionism, is an art style that puts itself in competition with the world—the 
radicalism of abstractionism breaks with the naturalist principle of Western tradition and replaces it 
with a new reference. Alberto Martinengo, “Metaphor and Canon in Paul Ricœur: From an Aesthetic 
Point of View,” Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics 2 (2010): 309. 
32 “I say that the painting is sad rather than gay, even though only sentient beings are gay or sad. 
Nevertheless, there is a metaphorical truth here, for the mistake in label application is equivalent to 
the reassignment of a label, such that ‘sad’ is more appropriate than ‘gay.’ The literal falsity, through 
misassignment of a label, is transformed into metaphorical truth through reassignment of the label. I 
will show later how the intermediary of the theory of models allows one to interpret this reassignment 
in terms of redescription. The heuristic device of fiction must be inserted between description and 
redescription, and this will be accomplished by the theory of models” (278.) Paul Ricœur, The Rule of 
Metaphor, trans. by Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2004,) 278.  
33 Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 281. Also, Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapólis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1968,) 88. 
34 Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 298. 
35 Jean-Marc Tétaz, “La métaphore entre sémantique et ontologie. La réception de la philosophie 
analytique du langage dans l'herméneutique de Paul Ricœur,” Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies 
5, nº 1 (2014): 76. Accessed August 10, 2016, doi: 10.5195/errs.2014.246. The analysis of Ricœur’s 
concept of metaphor, close to a Heideggerian concept of language, runs into a contradiction in terms 
of the innovation produced by the writer/poet. It is interesting to confront this interpretation with 
Tengelyi’s, which affirms that closeness. Although he makes a distinction between redescription and 
refiguration, there is some continuity with regards to metaphorical truth. “Redescription and 
Refiguration of Reality in Ricœur,” Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007): 164. 
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